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Ladner: Corporate Law - Developing Uniformity in Limitations Periods for

1994]
CORPORATE LAW-DEVELOPING UNIFORMITY IN LIMITATIONS PERIODS
FOR IMPLIED PRIVATE ACIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE

ACT OF 1934
Westinghouse Electric Corp. by Levit v. Franklin (1993)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1964, corporate shareholders received increased protection when
the United States Supreme Court recognized an implied private cause of
action for violations of section 14(a)1 of the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 (1934 Act) and accompanying Rule 14a-9.3 As a result, sharehold1. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). Section 14(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a
national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or
to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
Id.

Many shareholders in large corporations are unable to attend shareholder
meetings, thus the use of proxies has become more significant. MichaelJ. Hetzer,
Comment, Proxy Regulation: EnsuringAccurate Disclosure Through a Negligence Stan-

dard, 50 FoR)HAm L. REV. 1423, 1425 (1982). Section 14(a) helps guarantee the
use of proxies as an effective organizational tool. Id. at 1425-26.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988). The 1934 Act was a regulatory response to
financial market abuses of the 1920s and the stock market crash of 1929. Steve
Thel, The OriginalConception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L.

REV. 385, 408-09 (1990). The 1934 Act also amended certain aspects of the Securities Act of 1933. In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1548 (3d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988). The court in In re DataAccess Systems Securities Litigation stated:
The various sections of the 1933 Act dealt at some length with the required contents of registration statements and prospectuses and expressly
provided for private civil causes of action.... The 1934 Act was divided
into two titles. Title I was denominated "Regulation of Securities Exchanges," and Title II was denominated "Amendments to Securities Act
of 1933."
Id.
3. 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-9(a) (1992). Rule 14a-9 provides in pertinent part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in
the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material
fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or
subject matter which has become false or misleading.
Id.

(1033)
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ers could bring private actions to recover for damages caused by omissions
or misleading statements in the proxy process. 4 However, the protection
offered to shareholders varied among and within federal circuits because
different federal courts applied different limitations periods to these implied private actions. 5 Thus, litigants seeking favorable limitations periods
often engaged in forum shopping when filing Rule 14a-9 actions. 6 Uncertainty and forum shopping also existed in applying limitations periods to
other implied private actions under the 1934 Act, including private civil
actions brought under section 10(b) 7 and accompanying Rule 10b-5. 8
The Supreme Court recognized an implied private cause of action in J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's hold-

ing, see infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
4. See C. Steven Bradford, The PossibleFuture of PrivateRights of Action for Proxy
Fraud: The Parallel Between Borak and Wilko, 70 NEB. L. REv. 306, 316 (1991)

("[T]he Supreme Court held that private parties injured by circulation of a false
and misleading proxy statement had a private right of action under section 14(a)

of the 1934 Act.").
5. For a discussion of the different statutes of limitations that courts applied
to certain implied private actions brought under the 1934 Act, see infra notes 30-39
and accompanying text.
In the case of implied private actions brought under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act
and accompanying Rule 14a-9, there was no congressionally defined limitations
period because the judiciary implied this private cause of action. Thus, federal
courts looked to state law under the "absorption doctrine" to determine the applicable limitations period. For a discussion of the "absorption doctrine" and the
resultant application of differing limitations periods, see infra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the uncertainty and potential forum shopping created
by this lack of uniformity, see infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988). Section 10 of the 1934 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.

8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992). Rule 10b-5 promulgated under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-

ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss4/9

2

Ladner: Corporate Law - Developing Uniformity in Limitations Periods for

1994]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

1035

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however,
applied a new approach to this problem. In 1988, the Third Circuit applied a one-year/three-year federal limitations period to private civil actions brought under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 9 Two other circuits
subsequently adopted this approach, 10 followed later by the Supreme
Court.1 1 Recently, the Third Circuit held that the one-year/three-year
actions brought
federal limitations period also applies to private civil
2
under section 14(a) and accompanying Rule 14a-9.1
This Casebrief traces the development of the Third Circuit approach
to applying federal limitations periods to implied private actions brought
under the 1934 Act. First, this Casebrief examines judicial recognition of
implied private rights of action under the 1934 Act and the disparate application of state limitations periods to these actions. 13 Next, this
Casebrief discusses the evolution of a uniform federal limitations period
for Rule lOb-5 actions and the subsequent congressional reaction.1 4 Finally, this Casebrief examines the Third Circuit's application of the oneyear/three-year federal limitations period to Rule 14a-9 actions, 15 concluding that the Third Circuit is the forerunner in6 an approach that is
soon to be uniform throughout the federal courts.'
II.

LIMITATIONS PERIODS IN RULE

A.

14A-9 ACTIONS

Implied PrivateRights of Action

The introductory paragraph of the session laws to the 1934 Act states
that the Act is "[t]o provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and
Id.
9. In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988). For a discussion of the court's analysis and holding in
this case, see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.

10. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying one-

year/three-year federal limitations period to claim brought under § 10 and § 14 of
1934 Act); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying one-year/three-year federal limitations period to claim brought under § 10 of

1934 Act), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991).
11. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350
(1991). For a discussion of the Court's holding and analysis, see infra notes 58-63
and accompanying text.

12. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. by Levit v. Franklin, 993 F.2d 349 (3d Cir.

1993). For a discussion of the court's analysis and holding, see infra notes 72-87,
95-117 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of implied private rights of action under the 1934 Act and
the disparate application of limitations periods, see infra notes 17-43 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the application of a federal limitations period to rule

101>5 actions and the congressional reaction to that development, see infra notes
44-70 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to limitations periods

under Rule 14a-9, see infra notes 72-117 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
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of over-the-counter markets... to prevent inequitable and unfair practices
on such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes." 17 To further
these purposes, Congress included in the 1934 Act various express causes
of action with express limitations periods.' 8 Later, many federal courts
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).

18. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a), (c) (1988) (sections 9(e) and 18 of
1934 Act contain one-year/three-year limitations period). Section 16(b) contains
a two year limitations period, while § 20A was added in 1988 as part of the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, which contains a five year
limitations period. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a), (b)(4)
(1994).
Section 9(e) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section, shall be liable to any
person who shall purchase or sell any security at a price which was afected by such act or transaction, and the person so injured may sue in
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the
damages sustained as a result of any such act or transaction.... No action
shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section,
unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation.

15 U.S.C. § 78i(e).
Section 18 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement
in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or
any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this
title, which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall
have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such
statement, for damages caused by such reliance ....A person seeking to
enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction.
(c) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created
under this section unless brought within one year after the discovery of
the facts constituting the cause of action and within three years after such
cause of action accrued.

15 U.S.C. § 78r(a), (c).

Section 18 is the only provision that can apply in the proxy process in which
Congress expressly provided for a private action. Marc I. Steinberg & William A.
Reece, The Supreme Court, Implied Rights of Action, and Proxy Regulation, 54 OHIO ST.
LJ.67, 98 (1993). Only purchasers and sellers of securities may bring suit however, and "there has been no reported case successfully invoking § 18(a)." Id. (citing Edward F. Greene, Determining the Responsibilities of Underwriters Distributing
Securities Within an Integrated Disclosure System, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 755, 758
(1981)).

Section 16(b), which contains a two year limitations period, provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of
such issuer.., shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer ....Suit to
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implied private rights of action for certain sections of the 1934 Act in
which Congress had not expressly authorized private actions.1 9
In a 1946 decision, Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,20 a district judge in
the Third Circuit first suggested that federal courts should recognize an
implied private right of action for violations of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. 21 The Supreme Court, however, did not recognize an implied private right of action under the 1934 Act until its 1964 decision, J.L Case Co.
v. Borak.22 The plaintiffs in this derivative action alleged that the defendants violated section 14(a) of the 1934 Act by including misrepresentations
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of
the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer... but no such suit
shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was

realized.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
Section 20A provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the
rules or regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while
in possession of material, nonpublic information shall be liable in an action in any court [of] competent jurisdiction to any person who ...
purchased.., or sold... securities of the same class.

has

(b) (4) No action may be brought under this section more than 5
years after the date of the last transaction that is the subject of the
violation.
15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (a), (b) (4).
Finally, the 1934 Act amended the limitations period for all causes of action in

the 1933 Act to the one-year/three-year period. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1991).
19. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(implying private right of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5); see

also 3 Louis Loss,

SEcuRmES REGULA1ION

1763-64 (2d ed. 1961); 6 Louis Loss,

SEcuarrms REGULATION 3869-73 (2d ed. Supp. 1969) (indicating that by 1969, 10

of 11 Courts of Appeals had recognized private cause of action under Rule lOb-5,
although Supreme Court had not yet directly ruled on issue); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981) (examining history of Supreme
Court recognition of implied rights of action). For a discussion of other sections
of the 1934 Act in which private rights of action have been implied, see infra note
26 and accompanying text.
20. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
21. Id. In this case, the plaintiffs sued the National Gypsum Company and
others for fraudulently inducing them to sell certain stock for an amount less than
the stock's actual value. Id. at 513. The defendants moved to dismiss, in part, for
failure to state a cause of action. Id. The court noted that the complaint alleged a
violation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, a section not expressly providing for a private
cause of action. Id. Judge Kirkpatrick, however, stated that the 1934 Act disclosed
"a broad purpose to regulate securities transactions of all kinds." Id. at 514. "[I]n
view of the general purpose of the Act, the mere omission of an express provision
for civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the general law implies." Id.
Thus, the district court denied the motion to dismiss and allowed this private cause
of action to continue. Id. at 514-15.
22. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 9

1038

VIL..ANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39: p. 1033

in a proxy statement. 23 Noting that "federal courts have the power to
grant all necessary remedial relief," the Supreme Court held that a shareholder could bring either a direct or derivative action for violations of
section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. 24 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
defined the parameters of materiality and causation required to bring a
private action under Rule 14a-9.2 5 Later, the Supreme Court also recognized an implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5.26
23. Id. at 427. The plaintiff alleged that he and other shareholders ofJ.I. Case
Company were deprived of preemptive rights due to a merger between J.I. Case
Company and American Tractor Corporation "effected through the circulation of
a false and misleading proxy statement by those proposing the merger." Id.
24. Id. at 432-34.
25. The Court first addressed the issue of causation. Mills v. Electric AutoLite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). In Mills, the Court held that when a finding of
materiality exists, the shareholder satisfies causation by showing the proxy solicitation itself was an "essential link" in accomplishing the transaction. Mills, 396 U.S.
at 385.

Later, the Court clarified the issue of materiality. TSC Indus. v. Northway,

Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). The Court stated that "[a]n omitted fact is material if

there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote." Id. at 449. The omission or misrepresentation
does not have to be the most important factor in the shareholder's decision, instead it only must be substantially likely that disclosure of the fact would have been
viewed by a shareholder "as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." Id.
Finally, the Court clarified two other issues: (1) "[W]hether a statement
couched in conclusory or qualitative terms purporting to explain directors' reasons for recommending certain corporate action can be materially misleading
within the meaning of Rule 14a-9" and (2) whether minority shareholders, whose
votes are not required to authorize the action at issue in the proxy solicitation, can
establish damages caused by the misleading solicitation. Virginia Bankshares, Inc.
v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1087 (1991). The Court held that knowingly false
statements explaining directors' reasons for recommending certain action may be

actionable, but the plaintiff must show that there was "something false or misleading in what the statements expressly or impliedly declare about its subject." Id. at
1096. The Court also rejected any theory of causation that offered protection to
shareholders whose votes were not required for the action at issue in the proxy
solicitation. Id. at 1102-05.
26. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971). In this case, the liquidator of a casualty company alleged that the company
was injured by the fraudulent sale of certain securities the company owned. Id. at
7. The liquidator alleged violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933
Act) and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Id. The Supreme Court held that the complaint
properly alleged a violation of § 10(b). Id. at 13-14. In a footnote, the Court
stated, "[i]t is now established that a private right of action is implied under
§ 10(b)." Id. at 13 n.9.

Note that in addition to § 14(a) and § 10(b), federal courts have recognized
implied private rights of action for other sections of the 1934 Act. See Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 55 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("No one
seriously questions the premise that Congress implicitly created a private right of
action when it enacted § 14(e) in 1968."); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,
358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir.) (noting that violations of§ 6(b) may give rise to private
right of action, but here plaintiff failed to state claim), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
(1966); Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987) (implying
private right of action under § 13(e)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
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Although the judiciary created these implied private rights of action
and defined certain parameters, neither the judiciary nor Congress specified exact limitations periods for these actions. 27 Courts, therefore, used
the "absorption doctrine" to determine the applicable statute of limitations for implied private rights of action under the 1934 Act.2 8 Under the
absorption doctrine, "a court 'borrows' or 'absorbs' the local time limitation most analogous to the case at hand."29
B.

Effects of the Absorption Doctrine

In the case of implied private rights of action under the 1934 Act, use
of the absorption doctrine led to great disparity of limitations periods between federal circuits and even within federal circuits. 30 One reason for
this disparity was that courts differed as to what state law was most analoSince 1975 however, the Supreme Court has limited judicial recognition of
private rights of action. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)
(refusing to imply private right of action under § 17(a) of 1934 Act); Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975) (denying implied right of action under § 610 of Federal Elec-

tion Campaign Act and creating four-part test for determining implied rights of
action). See generally Frankel, supra note 19.

27. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990)
(noting that Congress did not create limitations period for Rule 10b-5 action because right of action under Rule lOb-5 was created by courts), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1250 (1991); Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task
Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus. LAw. 645, 645-46 (1986)
[hereinafter ABA Committee Report] ("Because Congress did not expressly create the
private cause of action under Rule 101>5, it did not specify a limitations period for
that action.").
Enforcement actions brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) are generally not restricted by a limitations period. See SEC v. Rind, 991
F.2d 1486 (9th Cir.) (holding no statute of limitations applies to SEC enforcement
actions), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 439 (1993).
28. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976) ("Since no
statute of limitations is provided for civil actions under § 10(b), the law of limitations of the forum State is followed as in other cases of judicially implied
remedies.").
29. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355
(1991) ("It is the usual rule that when Congress has failed to provide a statute of
limitations for a federal cause of action, a court 'borrows' or 'absorbs' the local
time limitation most analogous to the case at hand.") (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985)); see also UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704
(1966) ("[S]tate statutes have repeatedly supplied the periods of limitations for
federal causes of action when federal legislation has been silent on the question.");
City of Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1895) (discussing rule that
state statutes of limitations apply to federal patent laws).
This borrowing practice comes from the Rules of Decision Act. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1988); see Lampf 501 U.S. at 355. See generally Note, Limitation Borrowing in
Federal Courts, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1127, 1134-35 (1979) (discussing historical roots of
borrowing state statutes of limitations).
30. See ABA Committee Report, supra note 27, at 646, 653, 662 (appendix B)
(discussing inconsistency in limitations periods for Rule 101>5 cases and noting
that Rule 14a-9 situation parallels Rule 101>5 situation).
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gous to the implied federal cause of action at issue. 31 For section 10(b)
and section 14(a) claims, federal courts borrowed limitations periods from
state fraud laws, state blue sky laws or certain other state laws.3 2 Furthermore, because limitations periods for the same type of law vary from state
to state, differences occurred even when courts borrowed from the same
3
type of state law.

3

Thus, in 1986, as a result of this disparate application of limitations
periods, "the limitations periods for Rule 10b-5 actions range [d] from one
year in Maryland to ten years in Tennessee."34 Even within a single circuit
disparities existed. For example, in the Third Circuit, a court confronted
with a Rule 14a-9 or Rule 10b-5 action in 1986 might have applied the

31. Id. at 659-61 (appendix A) (listing borrowing practice of each circuit as of
1986 for Rule 10b-5 actions).
32. For examples of courts that borrowed limitations periods from state fraud
laws, see Reeves v. Teuscher, 881 F.2d 1495, 1500-01 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that
Ninth Circuit applies forum state's statute of limitations for fraud claims to Rule
10b-5 claims); Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123, 127-28 (1st Cir.
1987) (applying Massachusetts' three-year common law fraud limitations period in
Rule 10b-5 action); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 1982)
(applying Colorado's three-year statute of limitations for fraud to Rule 10b-5
claim).
For examples of courts that borrowed from state blue sky laws, see Short v.
Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that before
this decision, Seventh Circuit regularly applied state blue sky laws limitations periods to section 10(b) actions), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991); Buder v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690, 692, 695 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Missouri's two-year blue sky law statute of limitations to Rule 10b-5 claim);
O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18 (4th Cii. 1980) (applying limitations period
from Maryland blue sky law to Rule 10b-5 claim), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981).
Other courts used a case-by-case approach. ABA Committee Report, supra note
27, at 651 (noting that Fifth and Eleventh Circuits determine limitations period on
case-by-case basis); see, e.g., Sioux, Ltd. Sec. Litig. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 914 F.2d
61, 64 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Texas' four-year fraud limitations period to Rule
10b-5 action). The Third Circuit also used a case-by-case approach. See Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981) (looking first to state blue sky law,
but then determining state fraud law to be more analogous), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
938 (1982).
Finally, some courts borrowed from state catchall limitations periods. See Allison Dabbs Garrett, The Ramshackle Edifice: Limitations Periods for Private Actions
Under Rule IOb-5, 28 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 24-25 n.151 (1989) (indicating approach has
generally been rejected because not all states have catchall laws).
33. Compare Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d at 191-92 (applying Pennsylvania sixyear common law fraud statute of limitations to Rule 10b-5 action) with Steinberg v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 273, 276 (D. Del. 1984) (applying Delaware's three-year fraud limitations period to Rule 10b-5 action).
For further examples of cases where courts borrowed a limitations period
from the same type of state law, but the effective result was imposition of differing
time periods, see infra notes 35-36.
34. ABA Committee Report, supra note 27, at 646.
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Delaware three-year statute of limitations for fraud,3 5 or the New Jersey or
36
Pennsylvania six-year statute of limitations for fraud.
Application of the "absorption doctrine" also resulted in differences
in the use of "tolling doctrines," which affected burden of proof issues and
cutoff period determinations.3 7 Finally, if an implied private right of action under the 1934 Act involved plaintiffs from more than one state,
some plaintiffs' claims might be time-barred while others were not.3 8 This
widespread disparity in application of limitations periods resulted in uncertainty and forum shopping among possible jurisdictions. 39
C.

Changing the Limitations Period

Commentators criticized the absorption doctrine's use in the context
of Rule 14a-9 and Rule 10b-5 actions, however its application accorded
with Supreme Court rulings. 4° As the Third Circuit indicated in Roberts v.
35. Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures, Corp., 717 F.2d 105, 108 (3d Cir. 1983)
(applying Delaware's three-year fraud limitations period to Rule 14a-9 action);
Steinberg, 598 F. Supp. at 276 (applying Delaware's three-year fraud limitations period to Rule 10b-5 action).
36. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d at 191-92 (applying Pennsylvania six-year
common law fraud statute of limitations to Rule 10b-5 action); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 453-56 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying NewJersey six-year
common law fraud statute of limitations to Rule 101>5 and Rule 14a-9 violations).
37. Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (7th Cir.) (noting that determining tolling rules for implied actions has been "nettlesome"), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
943 (1987); see also braig W. Palm, The Constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities
Exchange Act: Is Congress Rubbing Lampf the Wrong Way?, 37 VIn.L. L. REv. 1213, 122526 (1992) (discussing differences in application of tolling doctrines).
38. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 355 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Indeed,
in a single such suit brought in a state whose law requires borrowing of the laws of
an out-of-state plaintiff, the claims of some plaintiffs may be time-barred while
those of other plaintiffs are not."). As the court noted in Ceres, one New York case
involved the application of 26 separate statutes of limitations. Kronfeld v. Advest,
Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1449 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
39. ABA Committee Report, supra note 27, at 647. "This uncertainty and lack of
uniformity promote forum shopping by plaintiffs and result in wholly unjustified
disparities in the rights of parties litigating identical claims in different states....
Vast amounts of judicial time and attorney's fees are wasted." Id.
40. For examples of commentary critical of using the absorption doctrine in
Rule 14a-9 and Rule 101-5 actions, see 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcurrMEs AND FEDERAL CoRoRATE LAW, § 8.31[3] [b] (1993) (indicating that absorption doctrine in
this context has resulted in "tremendous waste of judicial and other resources.");
Dennis J. Block & Nancy E. Barton, Securities Litigation, 7 SEc. REG. LJ. 374, 374
(1980) (describing result of absorption doctrine as "unsatisfactory state of affairs").
The Supreme Court, however, ruled that application of the doctrine was appropriate. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976) ("Since no
statute of limitations is provided for civil actions brought under § 10(b), the law of
limitations of the forum State is followed as in other cases of judicially implied
remedies."); Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (noting in dictum
that where Congress is silent, federal courts adopt analogous local law limitation
periods).
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Magnetic Metals Co.,4 1 "the Supreme Court has announced the rule that we
must look not for an analogous federal limitations period, but for an

analogous forum state limitations period. ' 42 That rule controlled until
the 1980s, when the Supreme Court reexamined and eventually altered its
43
approach towards the absorption doctrine.
In 1987, the Supreme Court outlined a new procedure to determine
applicable time limitations for federal actions that do not include an express limitations period. In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocsiates, Inc.,44 the Court considered the application of a limitations period.
to a private action brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO),45 a federal statute without an express limita41. 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979). This 1979 case involved allegations of
§ 10(b) and 14(a) violations as well as common law fraud arising out of a merger
in which the plaintiff sold his stock. Id. at 451-53. The district court decided that

the NewJersey Uniform Securities Act, § 49:3-71 (a), was the most analogous state
statute, and thus held that the claim was time-barred by that statute's two year
limitations period. Roberts, 611 F.2d at 453-54. Reversing, the Third Circuit held
that the district court should not have applied the limitations period of the New
Jersey Uniform Securities Act because the Act protects only buyers of securities, not
sellers. Id. at 452-56. Because this case involved a seller, the court determined that
the six-year limitations period for common law fraud in New Jersey was more appropriate. Id.
42. Id. at 454 (citing Johnson v. Roadway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454
(1975), UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966) and Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947)).
43. The first alteration occurred in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). In DelCostello, the Supreme Court rejected the
use of a state statute of limitations in two consolidated cases. Id. at 158-71. The
Court outlined a narrow exception to the use of state statutes of limitations, holding that a federal statute of limitations should be used when: (1) federal law provided a closer analogy than state law; and (2) "when the federal policies at stake
and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." Id. at 171-72.
Later, in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 263 (1985), the Court confronted the
"absorption doctrine" in the context of a civil rights action brought under § 1983
of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The Court laid out a three-step
procedure. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268. First, a court must characterize the claim to
determine whether state law or federal law governs. Id. Second, if federal law
governs, a court must determine whether all claims arising out of the federal statute "should be characterized the same way, or whether they should be evaluated
differently depending upon the varying factual circumstances and legal theories
presented in each individual case." Id. Finally, a court must determine which state
statute is most appropriate. Id.

In this case, the Court determined that federal law governed the characterization and that uniformity was necessary for § 1983 claims. Id. at 268-76. Finally, the
Court determined that tort law was most appropriate, and thus the tort limitations
period applied to this claim. Id. at 276-80.
44. 483 U.S. 143 (1987). In Agency, the Supreme Court essentially retained

the test set forth in Wilson and added the exception set forth in DelCostello. Id. at
145-49; see also Palm, supra note 37, at 1228-29 n.53 (describing Wilson test and
DelCostello exception, and stating that "the Supreme Court combined the Wilson

test and DelCostello exception.").
45. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964
(1988) (RICO).
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tions period for private actions. 4 6 Rejecting the Third Circuit's application of a Pennsylvania six-year residual statute of limitations, the Court
held that a uniform limitations period taken from federal law should be
47
applied to RICO actions.
In Agency, the Court set forth the following analysis to determine the
applicable limitations period. First, courts should inquire whether all
claims brought under the federal statute should be characterized the same
way or whether each claim should be characterized based on the facts and
legal theories of each case. 48 Second, courts should inquire whether a
federal or state statute of limitations is more appropriate. 49 Generally
courts should borrow from state law, but in some circumstances a court
may more appropriately borrow a limitations period from a federal statute. 50 Those instances include situations in which a federal statute is more
analogous than available state statutes or when federal policies and litigation practicalities make the federal statute more appropriate. 5 1
46. Agency, 483 U.S. at 145-46. In this case, Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.
(Malley-Duff), a former insurance agent for Crown Life Insurance Company
(Crown Life), sued Crown Life under a variety of theories after Crown Life terminated Malley-Duff's agency. Id. at 145. Under one theory, Malley-Duff asserted a
cause of action under RICO. Id. Malley-Duff alleged that Crown Life together
with Agency Holding Corporation "formed an enterprise whose purpose was to
acquire by false and fraudulent means and pretenses various Crown life Agencies
that had lucrative territories." Id. In particular, Malley-Duff alleged that Crown
Life attempted to achieve its purpose by setting unrealistic production quotas for
Malley-Duff and other agencies, and then terminating those agencies for failure to
satisfy their quotas. Id. Because RICO does not contain a statute of limitations for
civil actions, the issue in this case involved determining the appropriate statute of
limitations for a RICO claim. Id. at 146.
47. Id. at 149-57. The Court borrowed the four-year statute of limitations
from the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1988). The Clayton Act was considered
more analogous to RICO than any state law because RICO was patterned after the
Clayton Act, and "[b] oth RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney's
fees." Agency, 483 U.S. at 150-51.
48. Agency, 483 U.S. at 147. With regard to RICO actions, the Court noted
that a uniform limitations period is preferable because RICO claims can encompass a variety of activities, which could be analogized to different types of state laws
with different limitations periods. Id. at 149-50. The Court also noted that "characterization of a federal claim for purposes of selecting the appropriate statute of
limitations is generally a question of federal law." Id. (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 269-70 (1985)).
49. Id.
50. Id.

51. Id. at 147-48. The Court referred to certain cases where federal limitations periods were adopted. Id. at 148 (citing Occidental Life Insurance Co. of
California v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
357 U.S. 221 (1958); Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946)).
With regard to RICO actions, the Court indicated that a federal statute, the
Clayton Act, was more analogous than state statutes. Id. at 149-55. The Court also
noted that the practicalities of RICO litigation made a uniform federal statute
more appropriate. Id.
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Less than a year later, the Third Circuit had the opportunity to apply
the Agency analysis to a private action brought under Rule 10b-5. In In re
DataAccess Systems Securities Litigation,52 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
en banc, held that the limitations periods in the 1934 Act furnished a better analogy than state statutes. In addition, the Court held that the federal
policies and litigation practicalities in Rule 10b-5 actions made the federal
rule more appropriate. 55 According to the Court, a need for uniformity
required application of the one-year/three-year limitations period contained in most express actions under the 1934 Act.54 Thus, the Third Circuit adopted a federal limitations period for Rule 10b-5 actions-a
limitations period of one year after discovery of the alleged violation, and
no more than three years after the violation. 55 Soon after the Data Access
decision, the Seventh and Second Circuits adopted that same one-year/
three-year limitations period. 56 Nevertheless, other circuits continued to
52. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
53. Id. at 1545 (citing DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983)). In Data Access, certain purchasers of Data Access Systems, Inc. common stock filed suit following public disclosures of fraudulent business and stock trading activities involving Data Access. Id. at 1538. Later, the
Securities and Exchange Commission also filed a complaint against Data Access
and others. Id. This case involved the shareholders' third amended complaint,
which alleged that certain attorneys and accountants violated § 10(b) of the 1934
Act and Rule lOb-5, and committed common law fraud and negligence. Id. at
1538-39.
The district court determined that New Jersey's six-year limitations period for
common law fraud should apply. Id. at 1538. The defendants, contending that the
two-year limitations period for New Jersey's blue sky law should apply, successfully
moved for certification. Id.
The Third Circuit, en banc, first noted that courts in the circuit generally
select the state statute of limitations most compatible with the federal policies advanced by Rule 10b-5. Id. at 1541. Normally, the state blue sky law was utilized,
unless that law did not afford a civil damage action for the particular allegations of
that case. Id. The Third Circuit, however, noted that such a case-by-case approach
must be modified to be consistent with recent Supreme Court holdings. Id. at
1543 (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143
(1987), Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) and DelCostello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983)). Thus, the court applied the
Agency analysis, concluding that it should use a limitations period from the 1934
Act. Id. at 1545.
54. Id. at 1545-50. The court looked at the express causes of action in the
1933 and 1934 Acts and determined that the available choices were either the oneyear/three-year limitations period for sections 9(e), 18(c) and 29(b), or the twoyear limitations period for section 16(b). Id. at 1545-46. Discussing the necessity
of a uniform limitations period, the Third Circuit determined that it would be best
to apply the one-year/three-year limitations period found in all but one of the
express causes of action of the 1934 Act. Id. at 1543-50.
55. Id. The court noted that the three-year period serves as a statute of repose, which absolutely bars litigation after three years of the occurrence of the
violation. Id. at 1546. For a general discussion of the functioning of statutes of
repose, see Palm, supra note 37, at 1218-22, 1231-32.
56. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 364 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying
one-year/three-year federal limitations period to claims brought under § 10 and
§ 14 of the 1934 Act); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th
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borrow from local law, thus maintaining the prior uncertainty in Rule IOb57
5 actions.
In 1991, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the disparate application of limitation periods for Rule 10b-5 actions. In Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis& Petigrow v. Gilbertson,58 the Court held that the one-year/
three-year limitations period applies to implied private causes of action
brought under Rule 10b-5. 59 The Court confirmed the analysis set forth
in Agency, but stated that when an action is "implied under a statute that
also contains an express cause of action with its own time limitation, a
court should look first to the statute of origin to ascertain the proper limitations period." 60 Therefore, the Court looked first to both the Securities
Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the 1934 Act. 61 The Court concluded that the
most analogous provisions to section 10(b) were certain express causes of
actions in those Acts containing the one-year/three-year limitations peCir. 1990) (applying one-year/three-year federal limitations period to claim
brought under §10 of the 1934 Act), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991). These two
circuits also emphasized the need for a uniform limitations period in Rule 10b-5
actions. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 360-61 ("[W]e conclude thatjudicial selection of a uniform nationwide limitations period is what Congress would have intended for private rights of action judicially implied under those laws."); Short, 908 F.2d at 1389
("[E]veryone wants a simpler way - and to everyone that means a uniform federal
statute of limitations."). In addition to considering the one-year/three-year limitations period for §§ 9(e), 18(a) and 29(b), and the two-year limitations period for
§ 16(b), the courts in Ceres and Short also considered and rejected the five-year
limitations period for § 20A of the 1934 Act-added by the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 362-63; Shor 908
F.2d at 1390-92.
The Seventh Circuit also noted that equitable tolling does not extend the
three-year period of repose. Short, 908 F.2d at 1391. Congress included a statute
of repose, which acts as an absolute bar to litigation after three years, to prevent
investors from basing litigation decisions on the subsequent price of the stock. Id.
at 1392. The Seventh Circuit in Short stated:
Prices of securities are volatile. If suit may be postponed indefinitely on
equitable grounds, then investors may gamble with other people's
money. An investor in Short's position may sell her shares for a price
certain. If the firm does poorly, she keeps the money; if itdoes well, she
sues and asks for the increase in value.
Id.
57. See, e.g., Durham v. Business Management Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505, 1508
(11th Cir. 1988) (mentioning Data Access but, instead, adopting state law limitations period); TCF Banking & Sav., F.A. v. Arthur Young & Co., 697 F. Supp. 362,
365-67 (D. Minn. 1988) (same).
58. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
59. Id. at 361-62. For a discussion of the Court's holding, see infra notes 6063.
60. Lampf 501 U.S. at 355-59. The Court further noted that "[o]nly where no
analogous counterpart is available should a court then proceed to apply state-borrowing principles." Id. at 359.
61. Id. at 359-61. The Court indicated that in the 1934 Act, all of the express
causes of action, except for § 16(b), contain a one-year/three-year limitations period. Id. at 359-60. The Court also explained that when Congress adopted the
1934 Act, it amended § 13 of the 1933 Act so that all express causes of action in the
1933 Act would also use the one-year/three-year limitations period. Id. at 360 n.7.
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riod. 62 The Court confined the Lampf litigants to such a limitations pe63
riod, which resulted in their claims being time-barred.
The Lampf decision had widespread repercussions because certain
lower federal courts, determining that this limitations rule should be applied retroactively, dismissed many pending securities claims. 64 Concurrently, motions to dismiss were filed for claims involving certain highly
publicized financial scandals of the 1980s. 65 Concerned with the possible
dismissal of large securities fraud cases, Congress quickly reversed the retroactive effect of the decision by enacting section 27A of the 1934 Act. 66
Section 27A required federal courts to use pre-Lampf determinations of
62. Id. The Court rejected the SEC's contention that the most analogous provision was the five year limitations period of section 20A of the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (b) (4). Lampf 501
U.S. at 361-62. The Court also held that equitable tolling is inconsistent with the
one-year/three-year limitations period. Id. at 363.
63. Lampf 501 U.S. at 364. The Lampf litigants' complaints were filed more
than three years after the alleged misrepresentations, thus they were barred by the
three-year statute of repose. Id.
64. See, e.g., Caproni v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 15 F.3d 614, 616 (6th Cir. 1994)
(discussing district court's dismissal of plaintiff's § 10(b) claim after Lampfdecision); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231, 232 (E.D. Ky. 1992) (discussing court's prior dismissal of this case as time-barred after Lampf decision),
aff'd, 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993).
On the same day of the Lampfdecision, the Supreme Court also decided James
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991). In a fragmented decision, a
majority of the Court held that when a court decides a new rule of law, and the
court applies the new rule to the litigants in that case, the new rule must be applied retroactively to all such claims based on facts arising before that decision
(unless barred by procedural requirements or res judicata). Id. at 544, 547, 548.
Because the Court in Lampfapplied the new rule to the litigants in that case, lower
courts interpreted the combination of Lampfand Beam as requiring the application
of the new Lampf rule to all pending cases. See Palm, supra note 37, at 1250-59
(discussing Beam decision andresult of LampfBeam combination).
65. See David S. Hilzenrath, Senate Backs More Time for Investor Suits; Bill Would
Reverse High Court Ruling, WASH. PosT, Nov. 22, 1991, at DI (noting that hundreds
of millions of dollars of claims had been thrown out, and that Michael Milken and
Charles Keating, Jr. had filed motions for dismissal); Barbara Roper, Stop the Clock
on Swindlers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1991, at A25 ("Michael Milken ... and other
defendants filed legal motions in Federal District court last month to have eight
bondholder suits dismissed because of Lampf s new statute of limitations.").
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (Supp. IV 1992); see also Palm, supranote 37, at 1262-63
(examining Congress' reaction to Lampf and reasons for enacting § 27A). Section
27A provides:
(a) Effect on pending causes of action
The limitation period for any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991,
shall be the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June
19, 1991.
(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action
Any private civil action implied under section 78j (b) of this title that
was commenced on or before June 19, 1991 (1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19,
1991, and
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limitations periods for section 10(b) actions filed on or before June 19,
1991 (the day before the date of the Lampf decision).67 Section 27A also
required reinstatement of many claims previously dismissed due to the
Lampf holding. 68 As a result, federal courts still apply differing limitations
periods to Rule 10b-5 cases filed on or before June 19, 1991.69 However,
for Rule 10b-5 actions filed after June 19, 1991, federal70courts now uniformly apply the one-year/three-year limitations period.
D.

Third CircuitApproach to Rule 14a-9

Although finally providing uniformity in limitations periods for Rule
lOb-5 actions, the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the applicable limitations period for implied private actions brought under section
14(a) and Rule 14a-9. 71 The Third Circuit, however, recently took a step
towards developing a uniform limitations period for section 14(a) actions.
72
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. by Levit v. Franklin, the Third Circuit held
that the federal one-year/three-year limitations period that applies to secdon 10(b) actions, also applies to implied private actions brought under
73
section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9.
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be
reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after December 19, 1991.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (Supp. IV 1992).
Section 476 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-246, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991), was codified as § 27A of the
1934 Act. Originally, two bills were introduced, each with a set limitations period
for § 10(b) actions, but the result was a product of compromise. See Palm, supra
note 37, at 1262 n.207.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (a). Note also that § 27A requires courts to apply preBeam retroactivity rules. See id. § 78aa-1(a),(b).
68. See id. § 78aa-1 (b).
69. See id. § 78aa-1. Certain courts, however, have held that § 27A is unconstitutional. See, e.g., In re Brichard Sec. Litig., No. C-87-1987, 1992 WL 63399 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 27, 1992); Johnson v. Cigna Corp., No. 90-B-177, 1992 WL 59022 (D.C.
Col. Mar. 20, 1992).
70. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993) (solidifying rule that Supreme Court proposed in fractured Beam decision). In Harper,a
7-2 decision, the Court held:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that
rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full
retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all
events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.
Id. at 2517. Thus, the effect of this rule is that the Lampf holding applies retroactively except where § 27A dictates otherwise.
71. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. by Levit v. Franklin, 789 F. Supp. 1313, 1317
(D.NJ. 1992) (indicating Supreme Court has not ruled on applicability of Lampfto
Rule 14a-9 claims), rev'd, 993 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1993).
72. 993 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1993).
73. Id. at 353.
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In Westinghouse, two shareholders brought a derivative suit and class
action against directors and senior officers of Westinghouse Electric Corporation.74 The suit alleged, in part, violations of section 14(a) and Rule
14a-9. 75 The shareholders claimed that directors omitted material information and included false and misleading information in proxy statements concerning Westinghouse actions in the Philippines. 76 The
shareholders requested that the district court void a directors' election,
rescind an amendment to the corporation's articles of incorporation, and
77
grant compensatory damages.
The district court, noting that the same limitations period generally
governs suits brought under section 10(b) and section 14(a), held that
under the Lampf analysis the one-year/three-year rule should be applied
to Rule 14a-9 claims. 78 However, the court refused to apply the one-year/
three-year limitations period in this case, due to the "inequity imposed by
retroactive application" and because the Supreme Court had not specifically determined whether this new section 10(b) limitations period also
governed section 14(a) claims. 79 The district court instead applied the
New Jersey six-year statute of limitations governing fraud claims, and thus
held the suit was not time-barred. 0

The Third Circuit, however, reversed the district court, holding that
the one-year/three-year limitations period applied to section 14(a) claims,
74. Id. at 351.
75. Id.
76. Id. In particular, the shareholders claimed that officers of Westinghouse
exposed the corn pany to the possibility of "substantial losses" because certain officers made illegalpayments to gain a power plant contract in the Philippines, and
then the officers "failed to fulfill their obligations under that contract by substituting cheaper, inferior materials, components and equipment than were specified by

the contract terms." Id. The shareholders' counsel apparently requested that
Westinghouse's board of directors take legal action against those officers. Id. The
shareholders claimed that proxy statements were misleading for failing to disclose
such a request by the shareholders' counsel and also for failing to disclose that
Westinghouse spent money lobbying for the Pennsylvania "Directors Liability Act,"

which shielded Westinghouse directors from liability for any illegal activities that
may have occurred in the Philippines. Id.
77. Id. at 352.
78. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. by Levit v. Franklin, 789 F. Supp. 1313, 1317-18
(D.N.J. 1992) (applying Lampf analysis to determine that one-year/three-year rule
should apply to § 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 claims), revd, 993 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1993).
Aside from noting the traditional similarity in treatment of § 10(b) and § 14(a)
claims, the district court also noted that § 14(a) is similar to § 18 because both
sections protect investors from misrepresentation. Id. Accordingly, the court held
that the one-year/three-year limitations period found in § 18(c) also applies to
claims brought under § 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. Id. at 1318.
79. Id. at 1317-19. The court indicated that if it applied the one-year/threeyear limitations period the case would be time-barred because the plaintiffs did not
file their claim within one year of discovering the misrepresentation. Id. at 131819.
80. Id. at 1319.
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thus barring the shareholders' suit. 8 1 The issue on interlocutory appeal
was whether the one-year/three-year rule adopted for section 10(b) claims
in Data Access applies to section 14(a) claims filed after the Data Access
82
decision.
Under the rationale of Data Access and Lampf, the court first looked
for analogous provisions in the statute of origin, the 1934 Act.83 The
court determined that the 1934 Act contains similar provisions using the
one-year/three-year limitations period. 84 In particular, the court noted
similarities to section 18 and section 9, which serve to protect investors
and ensure complete information for investment decisions.8 5 Accordingly, the court concluded that the one-year/three-year limitations period,
contained in those sections and applicable to section 10(b) claims, should
also apply to section 14(a) claims.8 6 The Third Circuit further determined that the one-year/three-year limitations period for section 14(a)
87
claims should be given retroactive effect in this case.
III.

ANALYSIS

The Third Circuit has taken the lead in developing uniformity in limitations periods for implied private rights of action under the 1934 Act. 88
Data Access marked the first time any circuit held that the federal oneyear/three-year limitations period governs section 10(b) actions.8 9 Subse81. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. by Levit v. Franklin, 993 F.2d 349, 353-57 (3d
Cir. 1993). The defendants filed this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291(b). Id. at 350.
82. Id. at 350.
83. Id. at 353. Applying the rationale of DataAccess and Lampf,the court indicated that it discerned congressional intent to use a limitations period from the
1934 Act. Id.
84. Id. at 352-54.
85. Id. at 353. The court also found that both § 10(b) and § 14(a) were intended "to protect investors" and the Third Circuit generally applied the same

limitations period to both. Id.
86. Id. at 353-57.
87. Id. at 354-57. The court stated that because the certified question related
to Data Access, it did not consider the application of a LampfBeam analysis to the
issue of retroactivity. Id. at 354 n.2. The court also did not consider the applicability of § 27A because its express terms only address § 10(b) claims. Id. Instead, the
court relied on Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), which provided an
analysis based upon equitable factors. Westinghouse, 993 F.2d at 354. Under the
Chevron analysis, the Third Circuit determined that its decision should apply retroactively. Id. at 354-56. The court also stated that "[a]t a minimum Data Access
should have put plaintiffs on notice as to the likelihood of a uniform limitations

period for other implied causes of actions under the Securities Exchange Act, particularly given the tradition in this judicial circuit of applying the same limitations
period to Section 10(b) claims and Section 14(a) claims." Id. at 356.
88. For a discussion of this development, see supra notes 52-87 and accompanying text.

89. In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion and
reasoning in Data Access, see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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quently, that limitations period became the uniform limitations period in
all federal courts for section 10(b) actions brought afterJune 19, 1991.90
Recently in Westinghouse, the Third Circuit decided to apply that same federal limitations period to a section 14(a) action. 9 1
The question considered in this Casebrief is whether the federal oneyear/three-year limitations period is the most suitable limitations period
for section 14(a) actions, or whether a different limitations period would
be more appropriate. This Casebrief contends that application of the federal one-year/three-year limitations period to section 14(a) actions is appropriate. Furthermore, other federal courts confronted with section
14(a) claims should reach the same result as that reached by the Third
Circuit.
In Lampf, the Supreme Court clarified the procedure to determine
limitations periods for implied private causes of action. 92 As discussed,
federal courts now look first for analogous provisions in the statute of origin. 93 Courts only look elsewhere if no analogous provisions can be found
there. 94 Thus, the Third Circuit in Westinghouse looked first to the 1934
Act and examined section 14(a)'s similarity to sections 9, 18 and 10(b).
The latter provisions, like section 14(a), "protect investors and ... ensure
their ability to make educated decisions regarding their investments ...
based on accurate and complete information." 95 However, the Third Circuit in Westinghouse did not discuss the two provisions of the 1934 Act that
96
contain different limitations periods.
Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act contains a two-year limitations period,
and section 20A, added by the Insider Trading Act of 1988, contains a fiveyear limitations period. 97 Clearly both of these provisions also protect investors. Section 16(b) allows recovery for profits made by corporate "in90. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's adoption of the one-year/threeyear limitations period for Rule 10b-5 actions as well as congressional limitation on
that holding, see supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
91. Westinghouse, 993 F.2d at 353. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion and reasoning in Westinghouse, see supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
The Third Circuit was actually the second circuit court to apply the one-year/
three-year rule to a § 14 claim, because the Second Circuit had decided previously
that the one-year/three-year limitations period applies to claims brought under
§ 14(d) and § 14(e) of the 1934 Act. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349
(2d Cir. 1990).
92. For a discussion of the Lampfprocedure, see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
93. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359
(1991).

94. Id.
95. Westinghouse, 993 F.2d at 353.
96. See id. The two provisions containing different limitations periods are

§ 16(b) and § 20A. For a discussion of these provisions, see supra note 18 and infra
notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
97. For a discussion of limitations periods for these two provisions, see supra
note 18.
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siders" on the purchase and sale of securities within a six-month period. 98
Section 20A allows recovery for profits made by persons engaged in insider
trading.9 9
Despite the fact that these two provisions also protect investors, the
Third Circuit used the limitations period from other provisions, presumably because sections 16(b) and 20A are not appropriately analogous to
section 14(a).10 0 Section 16(b) is not analogous to section 14(a) because
it does not involve disclosure of information. 10 1 In fact, even complete
disclosure fails to provide a defense against recovery. 102 Furthermore, sections 16(b) and 14(a) contain differing standards of culpability. With regard to section 14(a), most federal courts, including the Third Circuit,
hold that a showing of negligence will sustain liability.' 0 3 In certain instances, however, the possibility of a heightened standard of scienter may
be required. 10 4 Section 16(b), on the other hand, uses a strict liability
standard. 105
Section 20A is arguably more analogous to section 14(a), but it is also
not the most appropriate provision. Section 20A applies whenever a person violates a provision of the 1934 Act by trading "in a security while in
possession of material, nonpublic information .... ,106 Thus in certain
cases, section 20A, like section 14(a), can involve failure to disclose material information. 10 7 As the Supreme Court noted in Lampf however, sec98. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988).
100. Westinghouse, 993 F.2d at 352-54. The court did not discuss provisions in
the 1934 Act that are not analogous to § 14(a). Instead the court discussed only
those provisions it considered analogous to § 14(a). Id.
101. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 362 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding
§ 16(b) differs from §§ 10(b) and 14(d) because § 16(b) is not a disclosure
section).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 775 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1985)
(rejecting strict liability and applying negligence standard to § 14(a) claim); Gould
v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976) (requiring negligence
standard for liability).
104. See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980) (holding that showing of scienter required for outside
accountant liability under Rule 14a-9); see also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090 n.5 (1991) (Justice Souter indicating that Supreme
Court reserves question whether scienter required under § 14(a)).
105. Rule Proposal Relating to Corporate Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 26,333 [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
89599
(Dec. 2, 1988).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (1988). "A defendant is liable under section 20A
only where an independent violation of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder has occurred." In re Storage Technology Corp. Sec. Litig., 804 F. Supp. 1368, 1374 (D. Colo. 1992).
107. See, e.g., Storage Technology, 804 F. Supp. at 1374 (alleging violations of
§ 10(b) and § 20A arising from false statements, lack of disclosure and insider
trading).
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tion 20A aims at the specific problem of insider trading.' 0 8 Additionally,
the text of section 20A indicates that the provision lacks intent to enhance
any other protective provisions of the 1934 Act. 109 Furthermore, the standard of culpability under Section 20A varies depending on the independent violation of the 1934 Act alleged in each case.110
The primary reason why limitations periods from either section 16(b)
or section 20A are not appropriate, however, is simply because other provisions are more analogous to section 14(a). In Westinghouse, the Third Circuit noted similarities to sections 9 and 18, which expressly contain the
one-year/three-year limitations period, and section 10(b), which now impliedly contains that same limitations period."' Significantly, the court
seemed concerned that those provisions, like section 14(a), contain a disclosure element. 112 Section 18 implicates disclosure because it protects
securities purchasers who relied on false or misleading statements in a
document filed under the 1934 Act. 1 3 Section 18 is also the only express
14
private action under the 1934 Act that can apply in the proxy process.
Section 9 involves disclosure because it creates liability for inducing a
purchase or sale of a security via a false or misleading statement." 5 Section 10(b) also relates to disclosure because it protects against the use of a
"manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in the purchase or sale
of securities." 6 Moreover, Third Circuit courts have recognized similari108. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
361 (1991).
109. Id. The Court pointed to provision (d) which provides:
(d) Authority not to restrict other express or implied rights of action:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or condition the
right of any person to bring an action to enforce a requirement of this

chapter or the availability of any cause of action implied from a provision
of this chapter.

15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (d).
110. The use of § 20A requires an independent violation of the 1934 Act. See
supra note 106.
111. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. by Levitv. Franklin, 993 F.2d 349, 353 (3d Cir.

1993).
112. Id. (noting that §§ 9, 10(b) and 18 protect investors by guaranteeing ac-

curate and complete information).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988). For a discussion of § 18, see supra note 18 and
accompanying text.

114. Steinberg & Reece, supra note 18, at 98.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (4) (1988). Liability is provided through the language
of § (a) (4) stating:
If a dealer or broker, or other person selling... or purchasing...
the security, to make ... for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale
of such security, any statement which was at the time... false or misleading as to any material fact, and which he knew or had reasonable ground
to believe was so false or misleading.
Id.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). For the statutory language of§ 10(b) and its
disclosure aspects, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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ties between sections 10(b) and 14(a) and have usually applied the same
1 17
limitations period to both.
Some differences exist, however, between section 14(a) and sections
9, 10(b) and 18. Notably, sections 9, 10(b) and 18 generally apply in the
context of trading in securities,11 8 whereas section 14(a) does not involve
trading in securities, but instead involves the solicitation of proxies. 119
The standards of culpability also vary. As noted, most federal courts, including the Third Circuit, apply a negligence standard to section 14(a)
claims, although some courts require a showing of scienter. 120 Sections 9,
10(b) and 18 all require a showing of scienter. 12' Thus, in the Third Circuit and in most federal courts, the standard of culpability for section
14(a) differs from that for sections 9, 10(b) and 18.
Despite these differences, the Third Circuit concluded that sections 9,
10(b) and 18 are most analogous to section 14(a). 12 2 Certainly the fact
that these provisions protect investors by requiring disclosure shows a
strong similarity to section 14(a). 123 Furthermore, section 18 is clearly
124
analogous to section 14(a) because it also applies in the proxy setting.
Thus, while it is clear that sections 9, 10(b) and 18 of the 1934 Act are
fairly analogous to section 14(a), provisions in the 1933 Act might also be
examined to determine the appropriate limitations period. The Supreme
Court has previously noted the interrelation of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 1 25
Moreover, in Lampf, the Supreme Court examined both the 1933 and
1934 Acts to determine an appropriate limitations period for section 10(b)
actions.1 26 Although, the Third Circuit in Westinghouse only discussed similarities between section 14(a) and certain provisions in the 1934 Act - the
127
statute of origin - section 11 of the 1933 Act should also be examined.
117. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. by Levit v. Franklin, 993 F.2d 349, 353 (3d Cir.
1993).
118. For a discussion of these provisions, see supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
119. For a discussion of the proxy solicitation aspect of § 14(a), see supranote
1 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of the standard of culpability for § 14(a), see supra notes
103-04 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (holding
§ 10(b) involves element of scienter); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623
F.2d 422, 429 n.6 (6th Cir.) (indicating in dictum that § 18 requires scienter), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); Connolly v. Havens, 763 F. Supp. 6, 11-12 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (dismissing § 9 claim for failure to plead scienter).
122. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. by Levit v. Franklin, 993 F.2d 349, 353 (3d Cir.
1993).
123. For a discussion of the disclosure requirements of §§ 9, 10(b) and 18, see
supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
124. Steinberg & Reece, supra note 18, at 98.
125. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1968) (noting interdependence of securities laws).
126. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
359-61 (1991).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
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Section 11 of the 1933 Act uses the one-year/three-year limitations
period. 128 Furthermore, section 11 resembles section 14(a) of the 1934
Act because section 11 requires disclosure to protect purchasers of securities from omissions or false statements in registration statements.' 29 In
addition, section 11 utilizes a negligence standard of culpability, just as
section 14(a) does in most circuits.' 3 0 The only significant difference between section 11 and section 14(a) is that section 11 protects purchasers of
securities while section 14(a) protects voting shareholders.13 ' Thus, analysis of section 11 of the 1933 Act supports the Third Circuit's conclusion
that the one-year/three-year limitations period applies to section 14(a)
claims. Overall, an examination of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts supports
the conclusion that those provisions containing the one-year/three-year
limitations period are most analogous to section 14(a).
IV.

CONCLUSION

Sections 10(b) and 14(a) serve to protect investors.' 32 That protection increased when the judiciary recognized implied private causes of action under both sections.13 3 However, because courts applied different
limitations periods to these implied private actions, this increased level of
protection lacked consistent application throughout the federal courts .134
128. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988). Section 13 of the 1933 Act provides application
of the one-year/three-year limitations period to § 11. Section 13 provides in pertinent part:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability under section
77k ...unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue
statement or omission ....In no event shall any such action be brought

to enforce a liability created under section 77k... more than three years
after the security was bona fide offered to the public ......
Id.
The 1933 Act originally contained a two-year/ten-year limitations period.
However, when Congress passed the 1934 Act, it cut the period to one-year/threeyear and also included the one-year/three-year limitations period in all express
civil action provisions of the 1934 Act, except for § 16(b). Ceres Partners v. GEL
Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 362 (2d Cir. 1990). The Ceres court concluded that this
action "suggests that Congress, if it had provided an express right of action under
88 10(b) and 14, would have adopted a one-year/three-year period." Id. at 363.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. Section 11 provides for civil suit when any part of a
registration statement at its effective date "contained an untrue statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact .... Id.
130. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207-09 (1976) (discussing
provisions of 1933 Act that use negligence standard, including § 11).
131. See Hetzer, supra note 1, at 1438 (comparing § 11 of 1933 Act with
§ 14(a) of 1934 Act).
132. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. by Levit v. Franklin, 993 F.2d 349, 353 (3d Cir.
1993) (noting that § 14(a) and § 10(b) are intended to "protect investors").
133. For a discussion of judicial recognition of implied private causes of action under § 10(b) and § 14(a), see supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of this disparity, see supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
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Recognizing a need for uniformity, the Third Circuit first applied a
federal limitations period to implied private actions brought under section
10(b).1 3 5 Subsequently, that limitations period and the protection offered

to investors under section 10(b) have become uniform throughout the
federal courts.1 6 The Third Circuit has now applied that same limitations
period to implied private actions brought under section 14(a). 1 37 This
approach to section 14(a) actions accords with Supreme Court reasoning
and should contribute to uniform treatment of section 14(a) claims
throughout the federal courts.1 3 8 As a result, section 14(a) will eventually
offer greater protection to investors because those investors bringing an
action under section 14(a) will be certain of the applicable limitations period, and all potential litigants will be subject to the same limitations period.
Gregory W Ladner
135. In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion and
reasoning in Data Access, see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's adoption of the one-year/threeyear limitations period for Rule lOb-5 actions as well as congressional limitation on
that holding, see supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
137. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. by Levit v. Franklin, 993 F.2d 349 (3d Cir.
1993).
138. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis, see supranotes 72-87, 91124 and accompanying text.
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